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Introduction
The topic of an agro-
energy supply chain deve-
lopment has recently gained
relevance both in the acade-
mic and managerial-politi-
cal debate (Seuring and
Muller, 2008; Cembalo et
al., 2014), mainly in terms
of how to foster and mana-
ge integration along the
chain. A definition of chain
integration relates to a pro-
cess of progressive depen-
dence among different ac-
tors that share common in-
vestments, coordination of
activities, and processes of
learning and innovation
(Handfield and Nichols,
1999; Hugos, 2003). Most
chains are based on agree-
ments (formal or informal
contracts) between two or
more stakeholders. 
Integration through co-
operation is often associa-
ted to sustainable use of
the natural resources at the
base of the agro-energy
chain (McCarthy et al.,
2004; van Dam et al.,
2010; Scarlat and Dalle-
mand, 2011). Better and more sustainable management of
common resources is achieved when the rules concerning
the use of common resources are defined by involving eco-
nomic subjects who are in a situation of interdependence
(Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom,
2010; Ostrom and Walker,
2003).
Stakeholders operating
in such chains are focused,
for instance, on the use of
common investments, of-
ten together with the pro-
duction of other agricultu-
ral goods (Pellerin and
Taylor, 2008). In this
context, how to combine
relational and contractual
aspects remains still diffi-
cult to address (Meinzen-
Dick et al., 2004). The role
of partnerships alliances
results to be a priority. 
Two main dynamics can
be identified in a collective
alliance. First, the majority
of agro-energy firms keep
engaging forms of traditio-
nal integration like, for
example, contracts and use
of coordination, both formal
and informal, participating
to industrial clusters. Se-
cond, these firms are increa-
singly conscious of the en-
vironmental effects of alter-
native energy production.
However, how to manage
such effects is still contro-
versial among stakeholders. 
It seems evident that a model of a common business,
which links firm investments to social welfare and environ-
mental quality, needs new forms of chain organisation,
mainly through organisational and contractual innovation
(Freeman, 2010).  
This paper aims to assess whether the conditions exist for
promoting an agro-energy supply chain through a collecti-
ve action (Ostrom et al., 1999). The effectiveness of the col-
lective action depends, in fact, on the formal or informal
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Abstract
This paper discusses contractual features to manage and coordinate a hypotheti-
cal bio-energy supply chain. The present study focuses on farmers operating in  two
Regions of Italy, namely Sicily and Campania, somewhat representative of areas
with high potential of investments in new bioenergy supply value chain. Farmers
were asked to choose whether to participate or not in a collective investment regu-
lated by contract schemes. Monetary trade-offs were then computed among
contract attributes. A specific questionnaire was submitted to a sample of farmers
selected on the basis of their potential capability of investments. A stated preferen-
ce modelling approach was implemented so that farmers could make a choice bet-
ween alternative contracts reporting varying attribute levels. If energy-producing
companies are paying attention to biofuel production aiming at a diversification of
their activities, results show that farmers’ participation needs to be managed
through contracts that take care of investment length, warranty on investment re-
turn, and risk management. 
Keywords: Algal biomass, Choice Modelling, Biofuel
Résumé
Cette étude a pour objectif de parcourir les caractéristiques contractuelles pour la
gestion et la coordination d’une chaîne potentielle d’approvisionnement de bio-
énergie. L’attention est focalisée sur un ensemble d’agriculteurs qui travaillent dans
deux régions italiennes, à savoir la Sicile et la Campanie. Ces deux régions sont
considérées comme étant assez représentatives des  zones à fort potentiel d’inves-
tissement dans la nouvelle chaîne de production de bioénergie. On a laissé le choix
aux agriculteurs de participer à un investissement collectif réglementé par des ré-
gimes contractuels. Les arbitrages monétaires entre les différents attributs du
contrat ont successivement été calculés. Un questionnaire spécifique a été soumis
à un échantillon d’agriculteurs sélectionnés sur la base de leur potentiel  d’inves-
tissement. Une approche de modélisation des préférences déclarées a été utilisée
afin que les agriculteurs choisissent entre les contrats alternatifs représentant plu-
sieurs niveaux d’attributs. Si d’un côté les entreprises de production d’énergie s’in-
téressent de près à la production de biocarburants pour la diversification de leurs
activités, les résultats montrent que la participation des agriculteurs doit être gérée
par des contrats qui prennent en compte la longueur de l’investissement, l’assuran-
ce sur le rendement et la gestion des risques.
Mots-clés : biomasse algale, modélisation des choix, biocarburant
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norms that may be embedded also in contract schemes (Po-
teete and Ostrom, 2004). 
Results of the empirical strategy conducted through the
submission of a questionnaire tackles these issues conside-
ring the specific case study of a collective contract that fos-
ters a collective action to promote, though hypothetically,
an agro-energy investment chain (biodiesel production by
means of algal biomass). In particular, it considers the is-
sues related to farmers decision-making process on whether
to join or not a collective investment, analysing the trade-
offs they are willing to make over the attributes of the col-
lective contracts. It is worth underlying that a collective
contract is necessary in order to make the investment profi-
table. To this end, a group of farmers needs to agree to be
part of the collective contract and build up the investment
needed. 
A case study has been conducted in Southern Italy. We
implemented a stated preference model to investigate far-
mers’ preferences about collective contracts. Based on a li-
terature review and three focus groups with stakeholders in
two Italian regions (Sicily and Campania), four attributes
were implemented in the choice set: 1. Investment length,
corresponding to the number of years the proposed invest-
ment lasts. Levels ranged from 15 to 20 years; 2. Invest-
ment degree of riskiness, corresponding to five profiles of
risk ranging from low (long run return of 9%) to high (long
run return of 20%). This attribute was presented linking
high returns to high degree of risk. On the contrary, lower
degree of risk was linked to a lower long run return. It was
presented as assured by contracting an insurance whose
cost is equal to the difference in terms of long run returns
among profiles; 3. Capital invested warranted, correspon-
ding to an option that safeguards the capital invested. Such
option was provided by public/private companies and/or by
banks. Level, for this attribute, was either present or absent;
4. Management, that is the possibility, for the investors, to
take part in the entrepreneurial decisions taken in monthly
meetings. Levels, also for this attribute, were either present
or absent.
The choice of a stated preference method was necessary
because no actual contracting behaviour was available to
observe (Roe et al., 2004; Cembalo et al., 2016). In a choi-
ce experiment, based on an efficient experimental design,
respondents are asked to choose between alternative collec-
tive contracts with varying attribute levels to start biodiesel
production. Choice experiments have gained relatively wi-
de attention in the agricultural economics literature. To the
best of our knowledge, only few studies have implemented
this methodological approach to the analysis of farmers’ at-
titude towards collective contracts, that is still an unknown
area of farmer preferences (Lajili et al., 1997; Abebe et al.,
2013; Cembalo et al., 2014). Results of this study will indi-
cate the relevance of attributes of the contract in influencing
the farmers willingness to join agro-energy supply chain.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Paragraph one re-
ports on the supply chain presented in the choice experi-
ment and briefly describes the rationale behind the sample
of farms selected for the study. Paragraph two describes da-
ta and methodology implemented. In paragraph three re-
sults are presented in detail, while in paragraph four some
concluding remarks are outlined.
1. Supply chain and sample of farms
In this section a brief presentation of the supply chain
considered is presented together with the rationale behind
the choice of type of farms of the sample. The supply chain
is based on microalgae cultivation for biodiesel and
food/feed supplements production. The main characteristics
are the following:
● the algae species implemented is the Phaeodactylum
tricornutum;
● the production area, occupied by the plant, is 1,500 squa-
re meters. Based on our preliminary analysis, this area
is considered optimal for the achievement of a first le-
vel of economy of scale. However, the total production
area implemented is 2,000 square meters;
● the production of high quality algae biomass has been
achieved by using advanced technologies in photo-bio-
reactors. The latter are composed by vertical glass tu-
bes, and protected by a greenhouse to ensure both the
optimal control of algae growing conditions (11 months
a year) and high productivity per unit area.
The biodiesel system encompasses also a little biorefine-
ry. The biorefinery utilises the oil produced by algae bio-
mass along with the bioethanol from the giant reed biomass
(Arundo donax) or sulla biomass (Hedysarum coronarium).
The analysis of impacts that this system might have on
farm balance sheets was conducted by Cicia et al. (2015) on
a previous study on a sample of firms selected from the
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). From that study
it was possible to select farms that are located in Campania
and Sicily regions of Italy. Regarding the first region the a-
rea chosen is a district where a great number of medium and
large enterprises is present; the possibility of using polluted
soils for giant reed cultivation; the favourable climate that
makes less onerous the greenhouse conditioning in which
the algae are produced. In Sicily, the targeted area covers
Palermo, Enna and Ragusa provinces. In these provinces,
the sulla is widely grown in rotation with other crops and
utilised for fodder production. Moreover, these areas are
mainly hilly and characterised by the presence of medium
and large livestock-grain farms. The latter are mostly orien-
ted to milk or meat production.
More deeply, in Campania we focused our analysis on
dairy buffalo farms, whilst in Sicily the choice is fallen on
cattle farms for the production of both milk and meat.
Farms are represented in the size classes of 20-50 ha and >
50 ha. For each of the six farm groups profitability indexes
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1 The quantities required are 11,1 tons for giant reed and 9,6 tons
for sulla (also known as Italian sainfoin).
were determined by Cicia et al. (2015).
All the firms analysed are well capitalised. This aspect
seems to be a prerequisite since algae cultivation requires
significant investments. Moreover, since the intensification
of production processes leads an increasing of cattle load
that nearly reach the legal limits, the diversification of pro-
duction through algae cultivation is an alternative that does
not require further agricultural land. This is mainly true for
dairy farms. However, it should be observed that even for
medium and large enterprises the possibility to manage
such a type of industrial system is not realistic for all of
them. Indeed, the investments needed for this system are
equal to the average net return of both buffalo farms (ave-
rage area > 90 ha) and dairy farms (> 110 ha). Consequent-
ly, it seems appropriate to assume a joint management of
the algae biomass production system in which the partici-
pation of farm is commensurate to their economic size. 
The evaluation and comparisons carried out have taken
into account the technological and market challenges rela-
ted to the sector as well as its relative risks. Moreover, a fur-
ther factor considered in the analysis is the return on capi-
tal that in this type of farms can exceed 10%.
Undoubtedly, both the production yield and the food sup-
plements price are a source of concern to take into conside-
ration in the estimation. The choice to vary the yield per
unit of bioreactors from 36 to 44 g/mq/day is well justified
by the hypothesised system, and by the findings observed in
the literature (Cicia et al., 2015).
The average selling prices for high nutritional algae bio-
mass assumed in our analysis fall in a range of 37-55 €/kg.
These values have been identified on the basis of the infor-
mation gathered from the few systems in Italy and those
dislocated in other European countries as well as the fin-
dings observed in the technical and scientific literature
(Egardt et al., 2013). The market trends show higher prices
for national products obtained by microalgae grown under
optimal conditions.
Lastly, since farm participation to joint management of
algae cultivation is related to their economic size, the im-
pact on the net return, in absolute terms, is
higher in more capitalised companies.
This is the case of large dairy and wi-
ne&vine farms.
3. Data and Methods 
Data was collected through the adminis-
tration of a questionnaire with face-to-fa-
ce interviews. The aim was collecting in-
formation to interpret and understand the
choice behaviour of farmers concerning
the participation in a collective action
through a collective contract affiliation. A
total of 92 questionnaires was completed
concerning large-size farms operating in
Sicily and Campania regions: 74 livestock
farms and 18 vine and wine farms. As pre-
viously stated, the reason to specifically choose these two
sectors resides in the pre-requisite of having enough capital
capability to invest in this specific sector.
The questionnaire used for data collection comprised, a-
mong others, sections regarding farmers’ socio-demogra-
phic characteristics and farms structural characteristics
(Appendix A). Furthermore, the questionnaire included far-
mers’ most recent choices in terms of investments and in-
novation in their farm and in terms of participation to for-
mal or informal forms of cooperation or contract. Finally,
the questionnaire presented the conjoint/choice experiment.
Each profile of contract consisted of four different attribu-
tes compatible with the agro-energy investment chain (bio-
diesel production by means of algal biomass): 1. Invest-
ment length (from 15 to 20 years); 2. Investment degree of
riskiness (from 9% to 20%); 3. Presence or absence of Ca-
pital invested warranted; 4. Presence of absence to taking
part in the management decisions. Levels of the attribute
come from literature review (Cicia et al., 2015), three focus
groups.
Of all the farmers interviewed, 82 percent are male (84 and
72 percent respectively for livestock and vine and wine far-
mers), the average age is 45 years, with an average utilized
land area of 83 hectares (specifically, 98 hectares for lives-
tock farms and 23 for wine and vine farms).  With reference
to regional location, all the wine and vine farms are placed in
Campania region, while 66 percent of the livestock farmers
interviewed are based in Sicily.  With regard to previous ex-
perience with cooperation, less than 15 percent of the farmers
interviewed declared to have previously participated to other
initiatives. Finally, with regard to the farmers’ propensity to
cooperate within the investment opportunity, more than
two/third of the respondents stated their willingness to parti-
cipate in the collective action, with an average amount to in-
vest that varies significantly between the two farms typolo-
gies. While on average wine and vine farmers declared to be
ready to invest 33,000 Euros, farmers involved in the lives-
tock sector showed a willingness to invest much higher,
equal to 276,000 Euros (Table 1).
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  Wine & Vine   Livestock 
Variable Mean std.dev Min Max   Mean std.dev Min Max 
Utilized land area (ha) 23.21 23.64 2 80   97.63 91.75 14 450 
Age of the entrepreneur 49 12.62 24 69   44.41 11.22 24 80 
Gender of the entrepreneur 0.72 0.46 0 1   0.84 0.37 0 1 
1 if located in Campania 
Region 1   0 1   0.34   0 1 
Livestock count           319.3 446.7 6 2,500 
                    
Previous Participation in 
cooperation 0.375   0 1   0.09   0 1 
Knowledge of cooperation 
initiatives 0.375   0 1   0.15   0 1 
Stated participation in the 
investment opportunity 0.722   0 1   0.77   0 1 
Stated amount to invest 
(euro) 32,778 71,850 0 250,000   275,892 484,746 0 2,000,000 
Table 1. Statistical figures of the sample of farms.
From an empirical point of view, the framework used in
this study has roots in the random utility theory and it has
been applied for contract attributes analysis by Roe et al.
(2004) and Cembalo et al. (2014) among others. The mod-
el assumes that when a number J of contract alternatives
has showed to a i-th farmer, the utility assigned by the
farmer to each c contract alternative is a linear, additive,
and separable function of all a-th attributes that constitutes
the contract:
(1) Ui j= fi (xj)+ εij
where x
j
is a vector of observed attributes characterizing the
c-contract. 
The random nature of combining levels values populate
the matrix xj characterizing the j-th contract, including 121
different profiles of contracts over the total 828 submitted
in 3 tasks to 92 farmers (Table 2).
The alternative chosen j represents the outcome
of an expected utility maximization exercise of
the farmer. The random utility model considers u-
tility Ui j equal to the sum of an observable com-
ponent Bix
j
, with Bi as vector of unknown param-
eters varying across farmers, and ε
j
the stochastic
component:
(2) Ui j= Bixj,+ εij
Distribution of each Bi follows a normal distri-
bution N~(t,σ2), relaxing the i.i.d. assumption on
the error terms. Estimates of t indicate the average
value of the parameter: the greater (in case of sta-
tistical significance) the t, the greater will be the
preference for that attribute of the contract. Esti-
mates of σ2 show the variability of the preferences
toward each contract attribute across the farmers.
B parameters can be estimated through the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator (Train, 2003).
3. Results 
Below estimates obtained by conditional
(random effects) logit model are reported
(Table 3). From the estimation of the model it
appears clear that the only contract attribute
not considered by the farmers in their choices
is “Management”, that is the possibility,
for the investors, to take part in the entre-
preneurial decisions taken in monthly
meetings. The coefficient is indeed not
statistically significant (coefficient esti-
mate 0.451, z-value 0.286).  The model
provides statistical evidence that farmers
clearly prefer lower degree of risk and
shorter length of the investment. Such at-
tributes seem driving the farmers prefe-
rences towards the choice of a contract
more than other attributes. Farmers prefer
also the presence of the option that safe-
guards the capital invested. The relevance of the presence
of this attribute is also showed by figure 1 that reports the
influence of return from investment (degree of the risk) and
the presence of capital invested warranted condition on the
probability of choice the j-th contract.
Clearly, farmers willingness to join is negatively related
with the degree of the risk but the presence or the absence
of the option that safeguards the capital invested is indeed
able to largely shift the pattern of this relation.
Furthermore, parameters estimates reveal that the prefe-
rences towards the different contract attributes are quite
heterogeneous across farmers (figure 2): for instance, with
respect to the presence of the option that safeguards the ca-
pital invested, around the 25% of the farmers involved in
both livestock and wine/vine sectors seems to be uninteres-
ted to that option. Preferences for contract attributes vary
also between the types of farming activities: while the tota-
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Attributes  Levels definition  mean St.dev min max 
Investment 
degree of 
 
values are randomly generated 
from an uniform in the 9-20  
14.77 3.84 9 20 
capital 
invested 
 Presence (1) or absence (0)  
 
0.50 N.A 0 1 
Length  
Discrete value are randomly 
generated from an uniform  
17.54 1.69 15 20 
Management 
decision 
 Presence (1) or absence (0)  
 
0.50 N.A 0 1 
Table 2. Attributes and levels of contracts.
N.A: not applicable.
Random Coefficients (Bi) Coeff ()  Std.dev  t-stat  p-value 
Capital Warranted  2.04 0.586 3.48 0.001 
Management 0.451 0.422 1.07 0.286 
Investment riskiness  -3.651 1.093 -3.34 0.001 
Length -3.902 2.22 -1.76 0.079 
Constant (opt-out) -4.033 1.905 -2.12 0.034 
Coeff (σ2)       
Capital Warranted  3.531 1.047 3.37 0.001 
Management 2.068 0.644 3.21 0.001 
Investment riskiness 2.64 0.762 3.47 0.001 
Length  3.119 0.743 4.2 0 
Table 3. Conditional (random effects) logit estimates.
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Figure 1. Influence of return from investment on capital invested warranted.
lity of the farmers operating in the livestock sector prefers lo-
wer return and lower risk of the investment, a small share of
the famers involved in the wine and vine sector (around 5 per-
cent) prefers higher risks and returns (figure 2).
4. Conclusions
Energy-producing companies are paying attention to bio-
fuel production attempting at a diversification of their acti-
vities. One of the main reasons is to gain room into the sus-
tainable energy market. Companies, however, need to
(re)invent new forms of cooperation with several investors
and, often, they have to start from scratch. To this extent, a
deep knowledge of the specific supply chain mechanisms
and understanding how to manage integration and coordi-
nation become key elements to the success. 
The focus of this paper was to study under what conditions
it is possible to promote an agro-energy supply chain through
a collective action. In our study areas, Sicily and Campania, a
questionnaire was submitted to tackle the issue of a collective
contract that promotes, though hypothetically, an agro-energy
investment chain concerning biodiesel production by means
of algal biomass. The analysis considered some attributes of a
contract farming scheme and investigated the monetary trade-
offs farmers/investors are likely to make. 
Our results seem to highlight that cooperation among far-
mers can be enhanced by contract farming if effective contract
attributes are proposed to them. Results indicate, moreover,
that conditions for a contract farming approach, aiming at
building a bio-energy supply chain in the study area, do exist.
However, individual differences for contract attributes should
be taken into consideration. While companies would prefer
standardized contracts, our empirical evidence indicates the
need of personalized contract schemes. Farmers’ willingness
to join collective action/contract scheme seems, in fact, posi-
tively related with presence of the option that safeguards the
capital invested and, negatively with the investment length
and lower degree of risk (jointly with lower long run return).
Unlike the several studies in the literature on contract far-
ming, which have mainly highlighted economics perspecti-
ves or policy implication, this study specifically contributes
to managerial aspects. Our findings, however, suggest two
policy implications. First, a large part of farmers intervie-
wed have shown a significant motivation to invest in the
proposed project conditional to receiving assistance in the
field of capital investments. Hence, to promote participa-
tion in the proposed contract farming, public agencies
should support agribusiness firms by facilitating access to
credit and providing other forms of investment incentives.
This condition would be particularly useful for farms and
firms operating in the Mediterranean regions where credit
access is more difficult to obtain.
Second, our findings suggest that balancing the risk averse-
ness of farmers for capital investments is a prerequisite for an
optimal contract design. So, the risk averse attitude of farmers
might be balanced by innovative institutional framework ai-
ming at sharing either risks and benefits (Meinzen-Dick et al.,
2004; Cembalo et al., 2014). A possible policy intervention
could be the facilitation of collective action building by means
of producer organizations. This intervention may also induce
agribusiness firms to offer more competitive contracts to far-
mers that would gain bargain power through cooperation
(Poulton and Macartney, 2012).
Further research is needed in this field: i. The present study
does not explore contract attributes in detail; ii. A deeper far-
mers’ preferences exploration is needed. For instance, same
attributes but in alternative arrangements; iii. Finally, results
of a model with random effects is needed to go into potential
heterogeneity of responses; iv. Our study somehow lacks of
external validity. A larger number of interviews distributed
nationwide would improve our findings in this respect.
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APPENDIX A – The questionnaire submitted
Introduction
Dear Sir/Madam,
My name is (name of the interviewer) and I’m conducting a research for the University of Palermo and the University
of Naples Federico II. 
This research is aimed to know the opinion of farmers operating in this area about the real investment possibilities for a
new supply chain.
For this purpose, we would like to ask you to devote about 20 minutes of your time for responding our questions. Your
responses are strictly confidential and will be used only for the objectives of this scientific research.
Section I. General information on the farm
First, I would like to ask you some questions concerning you and your farm. I would like to remind you that all respon-
ses are completely anonymous and confidential.
1.1 Gender  M__  F__
1.2 Age________
1.3 Self-employed farmer  Yes  No
1.4 Municipality in which the farm is located
1.5 Legal form
Individual farm 
Cooperative 
Other________________________
1.6 Agricultural land utilized
SAT (Total Agricultural Land) ha______________ 
SAU (Utilized Agricultural Land) ha_________________ 
1.7 Land ownership (SAU)
Property ha_____________
Rent ha_____________
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Other (please, specify)________________________________  ha_____________
1.8 Main production____________________________
1.9 If the main production is livestock: 
species (please, specify if more than one species)_________________  
type of production (e.g. milk, meat, mixed)__________________
number of animals__________________  number of buffalos/cows________________
Section II. Attitude to changing
2.1 Did you do investments in your farm in the last 5 years? Yes__ No __
If yes, which investments did you do?
2.1.2 Machines No __ No __
2.1.3 New constructions Yes__ No __
2.1.4 Processing and packaging Yes__ No __
2.1.5 Marketing Yes__ No __
2.1.6 Land acquisition Yes__ No __
2.1.7 Other
2.2 In the last 5 years, you did:
2.2.1 Cropping system changes Yes__ No __
2.2.2 Cropping techniques changes Yes__ No __
2.2.3 Organization changes Yes__ No __
Previous experience with contracts
2.3 Are there any type cooperation in your area (contracts
or informal cooperation, such as sharing of machines)? Yes__ No __
If yes, which type?_________________________________________________________________________________
2.4 Did you participate or are you participating to one of them?  Yes__ No __
Why?  __________________________________________________________________________________________
2.5 Did you participate or are you participating in one of the following types of contracts or informal agreements:
Contracts Formal (written) Informal (verbal)
Single Annual 
Collective Annual  (cooperatives)
Single multi-year
Collective multi-year (cooperatives)
Section III. Choice scenario
Your farm is located in an area showing high potential to creating an energy supply chain for the production of biodie-
sel through a new technology based on algae biomass. This technology is also able to produce high value nutrients for hu-
mans and livestock from the residues of the algae biomass.
The interest in biodiesel in our country is growing. According to predictions about the use of renewable energies in the
future, the use of biodiesel will significantly increase in the next decades. Similarly, products generated from the residues
of algae biomass are gaining consideration in the domain of healthy food products for human nutrition. 
As regards as the socio-economic conditions of the area under analysis, a system for the production of biodiesel and nu-
tritional supplements would be an opportunity for both farmers and the community. Farmers would access to new and pro-
mising markets and new jobs would be available for the community.
The system for the production of biodiesel and algae needs a heated greenhouse (1500 m2) provided with photo-bio-reac-
tors, which are transparent plastic containers for cultivating algae in water. Furthermore, the system needs a lab equipped
with the machines for the extraction of oil from the algae.
This new technology requires an investment of € 2 million, that would be partially guaranteed from public/private capi-
tal (state/banks) and partially provided from local farmers in order to assure that positive effects of the investments remain
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on the site. There are already in Italy examples of supply chains that subscribe partnership contracts with
groups/cooperatives of farmers.
The aim of our research is then twofold: i. verify whether in this area there are the conditions for creating an energy sup-
ply chain based on biodiesel; and ii. identify which types of contracts local farmers would prefer for getting involved in
an investment for a potential system for the production of biodiesel.
An energy supply chain is grounded on a contract between farmers and the public/private company that produces algae
and derivative products. This contract regulates the starting investment and the allocation of profits.
Factors on which a contract is based – and on which please focus your attention – are the following:
DURATION OF THE INVESTMENT. Number of years for which the investor is committed. 
RISK LEVEL OF THE INVESTMENT. Risk profiles are five: low, low-intermediate, intermediate, intermediate-high,
high. High return of investment and potential profit fluctuations are associated to the high risk profile. The fluctuations a-
re due to the price volatility of both biodiesel and algae for humans and livestock. Lower risk profiles are less risky thanks
to an insurance depending on returns. The insurance cost represents the difference of the potential profit.
GUARANTEE OF THE CAPITAL INVESTED. Option aimed to safeguard the capital invested. The public/private com-
pany (state/banks) ensures to private participants a minimum return that allows to avoid the loss of the capital invested.
MANAGEMENT. Possibility for investors to be actively involved in business decisions by attending, on a bi-monthly
basis, management and administration meetings of the company.
Now, I will show you a set of possible types of contracts that could regulate the relationship between the farmers of this
area who decide to join the energy supply chain for the production of biodiesel and algae, and the energy company that
builds and manages the production system.
Contracts will be showed in pairs and will be indicated as contract A and contract B. For each pair, please focus your
attention on the abovementioned conditions implied for each factor, and choose the contract that you prefer.
EXAMPLE OF CHOICE
PLEASE, CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING PAIR OF CONTRACTS
3.1 Which type of contract do you prefer?
Contract A  [  ] Contract B  [  ]None  [  ]
If the interviewee has chosen at least one contract:
4.1 How much would you invest (in Euro – MAX 2 millions)? ___________
4.2 What is your average turnover per year (in Euro)? ____________
  
 
Contract A Contract B 
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DURATION OF THE INVESTMENT. Number of 
years for which the investor is obliged to invest his 
share.  
 
From 15 to 20 years 
 
RISK LEVEL OF THE INVESTMENT. Risk 
profiles are five: low, low-intermediate, 
intermediate, intermediate-high, high. High return 
and potential profit fluctuations are associated to the 
high risk profile. The fluctuations are due to the 
price volatility of both biodiesel and algae for 
humans and livestock. Lower risk profiles are less 
risky thanks to an insurance depending on return. 
The insurance cost represents the difference of the 
potential profit. 
 
Low 9% 
Low-intermediate 12% 
Intermediate 15 % 
Intermediate-high 17% 
High 20% 
 
GUARANTEE OF THE CAPITAL INVESTED. 
Option aimed to safeguard the capital invested. The 
public/private company (state/banks) ensures to 
private participants a minimum profit that allows to 
avoid the loss of the capital invested. 
 
YES/NO 
 
MANAGEMENT. Possibility for investors to be 
actively involved in business decisions by attending, 
on a bi-monthly basis, management and 
administration meetings of the company. 
 
YES/NO 
 
      
      
 
